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PUSHING THE LIMITS: REINING IN OHIO’S 
RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS FOR SEX 
OFFENDERS 
TAUREAN J. SHATTUCK* 
ABSTRACT 
The danger to children posed by convicted sex offenders living near schools, 
parks, and bus stops has been greatly exaggerated by the media. In turn, many state 
legislatures have attempted to find solutions to this perceived problem, imposing 
sanctions that seem to keep the “problem” at bay. A relatively new approach 
prevents those convicted of sex crimes from living within a certain distance of places 
where children congregate. Ohio is one of the states that has adopted this approach. 
The problem with this approach, however, is that imposing such restrictions on all 
individuals convicted of certain crimes imposes barriers to treatment and arguably 
infringes upon their constitutional rights, while the efficacy of the sanctions is not 
backed by research data. Despite the lack of empirical support, legislatures have 
continued to enact tougher new laws on sex offenders. If the Ohio legislature really 
wanted to effectuate their goal of protecting children from dangerous sex offenders, 
it would allow the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis whether residency 
restrictions would be proper. This is an approach taken by a growing number of 
states that takes into account research findings on sex offenders and recidivism, as 
well as addresses some of the constitutional concerns of the offenders. This Note 
argues for this policy shift in Ohio by examining the current approach and how the 
issue is evolving throughout the country.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“We shall act, and we shall act with good intentions. Hopefully, we will often be 
right, but at times, we will be wrong. When we are, let us admit it and immediately 
try to right the situation.”1 
 
Laws governing sex offenders, though enacted with benevolence, are ineffective 
as currently construed and may exacerbate the problem.2 When crafting policies to 
regulate sex offenders, legislatures turn to scare tactics rather than rely on research 
data.3 
Following a few highly publicized murders, states enacted residency restriction 
statutes to prevent convicted sex offenders from living within certain distances of 
schools, playgrounds, daycare centers, and other places where children often 
congregate.4 However, studies show that these statutes are not effective in reducing 
recidivism.5 Additionally, some courts hold that these statutes are unconstitutional.6 
This Note argues that Ohio’s approach to residency restrictions has gone too far. 
Ohio needs a system that gives individual judges discretion in imposing restrictions 
efficaciously.  
Ohio law imposes residency restrictions on individuals convicted of sex 
offenses.7 Depending on the underlying conviction, the offender is classified in one 
of three tiers.8 These tiers categorize crimes based on their nature and severity.9 The 
applicable tier determines whether he will have to register as a sex offender for a 
specified period of time.10 However, placement into these tiers does not account for 
                                                          
1 Joe Paterno, Commencement Speech at Penn State University (June 16, 1973). 
2 See Eric Tennen, Risky Policies: How Effective Are Restrictions on Sex Offenders in 
Reducing Reoffending?, 58 BOSTON B.J. 1 (2014).  
3 Christina Mancini, Sex Offender Residence Restriction Laws: Parental Perceptions and 
Public Policy, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 1022, 1024 (2010). 
4 Karen Terry, Sex Offender Laws in the United States: Smart Policy or Disproportionate 
Sanctions?, 39 INT’L J. COMP. APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 113, 116 (2015). 
5 Jason Rydberg et al., The Effect of Statewide Residency Restrictions on Sex Offender Post-
Release Housing Mobility, 31 JUST. Q. 421, 422 (2012). 
6 Terry, supra note 4, at 116. 
7 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.034 (West 2016). 
8 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2950.01, 2950.031. 
9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.01. 
10 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.04. 
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whether the offender is likely to reoffend.11 Additionally, Ohio law prohibits anyone 
convicted of a crime requiring registry as a sex offender from living within 1,000 
feet of any school, preschool, or daycare center.12 This restriction is imposed 
regardless of the tier in which an offender is classified.13 
Many litigants raised constitutional arguments against Ohio’s statutory scheme 
for sex offenders.14 Some of these attacks were successful.15 For instance, the Ohio 
Supreme Court recently held that residency restrictions cannot be applied to 
offenders who were convicted of sex offenses prior to the enactment of the residency 
restriction statute in 2003 and the amendments in 2007.16 However, offenders were 
unsuccessful in arguing that residency restrictions are unconstitutional violations of 
the Due Process Clause.17 The Ohio Supreme Court explained that the restrictions do 
not implicate a fundamental right; therefore, the restrictions are constitutional 
because they are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.18 
This Note further argues that Ohio’s approach to imposing residency restrictions 
on a blanket basis needs to be revised to only apply to sex offenders who pose the 
highest risk to the public. Based on the results of research studies and recent court 
decisions in different states,19 this Note shows that the application of residency 
restrictions on a blanket basis is ineffective and undermines the state’s interest in 
protecting children. Moreover, Ohio’s residency restrictions do not pass the rational 
basis test, which is currently used to determine whether the state’s legitimate interest 
overrides the offenders’ rights.20 
Part II of this Note discusses the background of residency restrictions for sex 
offenders throughout the country. This section highlights the history of legislation 
regarding sex offenders and the historical judicial treatment of residency restrictions 
for sex offenders. Part III of this Note examines the arguments for and against the 
use of residency restrictions for sex offenders. This section starts with studies that 
provide evidence of the ineffectiveness of residency restrictions for sex offenders. 
This section also provides an argument in favor of residency restrictions in a more 
targeted manner. Parts IV and V of this Note describe recent state action on 
residency restrictions for sex offenders, including how Ohio approaches these 
residency restrictions. Finally, Part VI of this Note concludes with a 
                                                          
11 See Margaret Troia, Ohio’s Sex Offender Residency Restriction Law: Does It Protect the 
Health and Safety of the State’s Children or Falsely Make People Believe So?, 19 J.L. & 
HEALTH 331, 334 (2005). 
12 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.034. 
13 See Troia, supra note 11. 
14 See generally In re Bruce, 983 N.E.2d 350 (Ohio 2012); State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108 
(Ohio 2011); State v. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d 753 (Ohio 2010); O’Brien v. Hill, 965 N.E.2d 1050 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2012). 
15 See generally Bruce, 983 N.E.2d 350; Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d 753. 
16 See Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108. 
17 O’Brien, 965 N.E.2d 1050. 
18 Id. at 1054. 
19 In re Taylor, 343 P.3d 867 (Cal. 2015). 
20 O’Brien, 965 N.E.2d 1050. 
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recommendation on how Ohio should manage residency restrictions for sex 
offenders that will better effectuate its goal of protecting its citizens’ safety. 
II. BACKGROUND ON TREATMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS 
A. History of Legislation Regarding Sex Offenders 
Legislation regarding sex crimes increased in the 1990s although instances of sex 
crime decreased.21 Some scholars suggest that increased media attention on a few 
high-profile crimes was the root cause for the increase in legislation.22 In short, the 
increased media exposure gave the public a false impression that sex crimes were on 
the rise, so the public demanded that action be taken to combat the perceived spike 
in crime.23 State legislatures quickly responded to the pressure from both the general 
public and the federal government.24 Focusing on the need to protect children, 
legislators passed laws regulating sex offenders without the support of much 
empirical research and relied upon the heightened perception of danger.25 
The increase in legislation regarding sex offenders began with the murders of 
several children.26 In 1994, Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against 
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act (“Jacob Wetterling Act”).27 
                                                          
21 Bianca Easterly, Playing Politics with Sex Offender Laws: An Event History Analysis of the 
Initial Community Notification Laws Across American States, 43 POL’Y STUD. J. 355 (2014); 
see also Richard G. Wright, Sex Offender Post-Incarceration Sanctions: Are There Any 
Limits?, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 17 (2008) (reporting that between 
1992 and 2000, substantiated child sexual abuse cases decreased from 150,000 to 89,500, or 
by approximately 40%). 
22 See Easterly, supra note 21. 
23 Id. at 355 (“The media’s role in disseminating information about and entertaining the public 
with crime stories significantly heightened public fear of crime in the 1990s.”). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 359.  
Recognizing the political opportunity that adopting sex offender laws presented, states 
hastily adopted some version of [sex offender registration and notification] legislation 
before federal intervention, naming many of the laws after the young victims such as 
‘Megan’s Law.’ Social constructionists would explain this behavior as a political 
opportunity for elected officials to demonize sex offenders further while reminding 
the public of their interest in protecting children as a way to ensure a substantial 
political payoff.   
Id.; see also Mancini, supra note 3, at 1024 (“[M]any federal and state legislative reforms 
have been named in honor of sexually victimized and murdered children . . . a development 
that has led . . . to the erroneous perception that ‘many, if not most, sex offenders go on to 
kill.’”). 
26 See Easterly, supra note 21, at 356 (“[I]t is commonly believed that extensive media 
attention to the tragic murders of Jacob Wetterling, Polly Klaas, Megan Kanka, and other 
children in the 1980s and early 1990s led to the most recent wave of sex offender laws.”); see 
also Wright, supra note 21. 
27 Elizabeth Ehrhardt Mustaine, Sex Offender Residency Restrictions: Successful Integration 
or Exclusion?, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 169, 169 (2014) (“[The Act] required states to 
track sex offenders’ places of residence annually for 10 years after their release into the 
community (and quarterly for the rest of their lives if they were violent).”); see also Daniel J. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss4/10
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The Jacob Wetterling Act created two components that impacted sex offenders: 
registration and community notification.28 The legislation established a national sex 
offender registry and required states to submit sex offender information, conviction 
data, and fingerprints to the FBI.29 The community notification portion of the Jacob 
Wetterling Act allowed states to release sex offender information to the public.30 
Congress gave states three years to implement the components of the Jacob 
Wetterling Act, threatening to withhold federal funding for failure to comply.31 The 
Jacob Wetterling Act was somewhat discretionary for local law enforcement 
agencies.32 Police departments were not required to notify the community about the 
“presence and location of sex offenders.”33 
In 1996, Congress amended the Jacob Wetterling Act because it determined that 
increased disclosure of sex offender registration information was important for the 
public’s protection.34 This amendment, which became known as “Megan’s Law,” 
requires law enforcement authorities to make information available to the public 
regarding registered sex offenders.”35 The federal Megan’s Law amendment to the 
Jacob Wetterling Act was similar to the original state version of Megan’s Law that 
was initially enacted in New Jersey.36 In any event, the Megan’s Law amendment to 
                                                                                                                                         
Schubert, Challenging Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act: Senate Bill 10 Blurs the Line Between 
Punishment and Remedial Treatment of Sex Offenders, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 277, 280 
(2010) (“[T]he Jacob Wetterling Act mandated that all states enact laws requiring offenders 
convicted of offenses ‘against a minor or a sexually violent offense to register a current 
address with state or local authorities.’”). 
28 Caroline Louise Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent 
Offender Registration Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to Privacy and 
Substantive Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89, 94 (1996). 
29 Id. at 95; see also Schubert, supra note 27, at 280 (“Under the Jacob Wetterling Act, the 
length of registration was determined by the ‘previous number of convictions, the nature of 
the offense, and the characterization of the offender as a sexual predator.’”). 
30 Lewis, supra note 28, at 95. 
31 See Wright, supra note 21, at 29. 
32 Id. at 30. 
33 Id. 
34 Kristen M. Zgoba, Residence Restriction Buffer Zones and the Banishment of Sex 
Offenders: Have We Gone One Step Too Far?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 391, 392 
(2011). 
[Megan Kanka’s murder], as well as others, alerted Congress that some law 
enforcement agencies were not exercising their discretion to notify communities of 
sex offenders living in the area, leading to inconsistent community notification 
standards. In response, Congress amended the Jacob Wetterling Act in 1996, which 
abolished law enforcement discretion and imposed an affirmative duty on law 
enforcement agencies to release sex offender registration information. 
Schubert, supra note 27, at 281. 
35 Id. at 393; see also Easterly, supra note 21, at 356. 
36 Koresh A. Avrahamian, A Critical Perspective: Do “Megan’s Laws” Really Shield 
Children From Sex-Predators?, 19 J. JUV. L. 301, 302 (1998); see also Daniel M. Filler, 
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the Jacob Wetterling Act received nearly unanimous support having been enacted in 
some version by all fifty states and the District of Columbia.37  President Clinton 
later stated the following in support of Megan’s Law: 
Nothing is more important than keeping our children safe. We have taken 
decisive steps to help families protect their children, especially from sex 
offenders, people who according to study after study are likely to commit 
their crimes again and again. We’ve all read too many tragic stories about 
young people victimized by repeat offenders. That’s why in the crime bill 
we required every state in the country to compile a registry of sex 
offenders, and gave states the power to notify communities about child 
sex offenders and violent sex offenders that move into their 
neighborhoods.38 
A decade later, Congress passed the Adam Walsh Act, which “enhanced sex 
offender registration and notification requirements, expanded the duration of the sex 
offender registration, and increased penalties for sex offenders who fail to register.”39 
The Adam Walsh Act “increase[d] mandatory sentences for federal sex offenders, 
civil commitment of sex offenders, criminal information record checks, child 
pornography investigative and prosecutorial resources, require[d] the creation of a 
national child abuse registry, and provide[d] grant funding for implementation.”40 It 
also created a classification system for sex offenders, which included three tiers into 
which different sex crimes would fall,41 and mandated that sex offenders register for 
a specified period of time.42 
                                                                                                                                         
Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315, 315 
(2001) (“Within days of [Megan Kanka’s] death, Megan’s parents . . . began a campaign to 
pressure the New Jersey legislature to adopt a sex-offender community-notification law in her 
memory. Their plea was personal and explicitly tied to the death of their daughter.”). 
37 Zgoba, supra note 34, at 392-93; see also Avrahamian, supra note 36, at 303. 
38 Maureen S. Hopbell, Balancing the Protection of Children Against the Protection of 
Constitutional Rights: The Past, Present, and Future of Megan’s Law, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 331, 
338-39 (2004) (quoting President Clinton’s Weekly Radio Address, CNN, June 22, 1996). 
39 Zgoba, supra note 34, at 393; see also Mustaine, supra note 27, at 170 (stating that the 
Adam Walsh Act also “created the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, 
Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking to oversee the implementation and maintenance of 
federal sex offender policy”); Schubert, supra note 27, at 282 (“[T]he Adam Walsh Act 
requires those law enforcement agencies to ‘make sex offenders’ information accessible to 
anyone with the click of a button.’”). 
40 Wright, supra note 21, at 31. 
41 Id. at 32. 
42 Id.  
Tier I offenders must register for fifteen years, tier II offenders for twenty-five years, 
and tier III offenders for life. Offenders who do not re-offend for a minimum of ten 
years may reduce the length of time that they must register. There is no provision for 
an offender to be removed from the registries prior to those minimum dates. Offenders 
are required to allow the jurisdiction to verify their addresses and take a current 
photograph of them: each year if they are a tier I offender, every six months if they are 
a tier II offender, and every three months if they are a tier III offender. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss4/10
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Another legislative measure taken to protect the public was the enactment of 
residency restrictions for individuals convicted of sex offenses.43 Florida was the 
first state to implement statewide residency restrictions in 1995.44 Currently, more 
than thirty states impose residency restrictions on sex offenders.45 Residency 
restrictions vary from state to state in their specific distances and zones excluded. 46 
The intent behind residency restrictions was to keep children safe by prohibiting 
sexual offenders from being in areas where children normally congregate.47 This 
concept is derived from routine activity theory.48 In reference to sex offenders, the 
routine activity theory 
posits that if potential sex offenders are not in close proximity to suitable 
targets (i.e., children), they will not have opportunities to commit these 
crimes, even in the absence of capable guardians (e.g., teachers, parents, 
coaches, neighbors, etc.). Therefore, policies on residential restrictions 
assume that these restrictions stop sex offenders from living in restricted 
areas, and that post release community correctional officers can regularly 
check on and ensure that sex offenders comply with their restrictions.49 
Residency restrictions for sex offenders are based upon the assumption that 
“most sex offenders meet their victims by going to nearby child congregation 
locations, loitering around, and gaining access to these young strangers by 
                                                                                                                                         
Id. 
43 Mustaine, supra note 27, at 170. 
44 Zgoba, supra note 34, at 393. 
45 John Kip Cornwell, Sex Offender Residency Restrictions: Government Regulation of Public 
Health, Safety, and Morality, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 7 (2015) (“In addition, several 
states allow municipalities within them to enact their own restrictions, either in lieu of or in 
addition to statewide regulation.”); see also Mancini, supra note 3, at 1023. 
46 Mustaine, supra note 27, at 170. (“These types of restrictions typically include prohibitions 
from living and loitering closer to various child congregation locations (e.g., schools, parks, 
daycare centers, etc.) than a legally specified distance (e.g., 500-1000 feet).”); see also Zgoba, 
supra note 34, at 393. 
47 Richard Tewksbury, Evidence of Ineffectiveness: Advancing the Argument Against Sex 
Offender Residence Restrictions, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 135, 135 (2014) [hereinafter 
Tewksbury, Evidence of Ineffectiveness] (explaining that the logic of such restrictions is built 
upon public safety – if sex offenders do not reside within sight or easy walking distance of 
places children gather, then those children will be spared sexual victimization); see also 
Mancini, supra note 3, at 1023 (“Residence restriction laws were heralded by lawmakers as a 
‘reasonable endeavor in helping parents protect their children.’”). 
48 Mustaine, supra note 27, at 170; see also Richard Tewksbury et al., Examining Rates of 
Sexual Offenses from a Routine Activities Perspective, 3 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 75, 77 (2008) 
[hereinafter Tewksbury et al., Examining Rates of Sexual Offenses] (“Routine activities theory 
was originally introduced by Cohen & Felson (1979), who believed that crime rates were 
influenced by the daily routines of individuals. Specifically, they believed that the 
convergence of (1) a potential offender, (2) a suitable target, and (3) ineffective or absent 
guardianship allowed for the necessary conditions to be present for a predatory crime to 
occur.”). 
49 Id. 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
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manipulation and coercion.”50 Despite the empirical evidence dispelling this 
assumption,51 many jurisdictions have increased the use of residency restrictions for 
sex offenders.52 Some states increased the use of residency restrictions as a 
reactionary measure to prevent the state from becoming a haven for sex offenders 
fleeing neighboring states with more restrictive laws.53 
As explained above, the proliferation of laws regulating the treatment of sex 
offenders has increased in recent history.54 These laws have increased because 
legislators do not fear backlash from their constituency for getting “tough” against 
sex offenders.55 The increase in sex offender legislation is also partly caused by the 
way the courts have traditionally treated residency restrictions for sex offenders.56 
B. Historical Judicial Treatment of Residency Restrictions 
Residency restrictions for sex offenders have faced many constitutional 
challenges over the years.57 Most constitutional challenges to residency restrictions 
implicate ex post facto laws or substantive due process challenges.58 Courts 
traditionally strike down ex post facto challenges “because the punitive effects of the 
statute [imposing residency restrictions for sex offenders] do not override the 
legitimate legislative intent to enact a non-punitive, civil, non-excessive regulatory 
measure to promote child safety.”59 
Similarly, courts rule against substantive due process challenges “by finding that 
the laws rationally advance a legitimate government purpose to protect children by 
reducing the opportunity and temptation convicted offenders with high recidivism 
rates face near schools.”60 As one scholar noted, “[substantive due process 
c]hallenges are difficult to sustain, however, because of the Court’s unwillingness to 
expand protections beyond traditional fundamental interests.”61 Because sex 
offenders have not been able to assert rights that courts deem fundamental, residency 
                                                          
50 Id. 
51 See Mancini, supra note 3, at 1024. 
52 Zgoba, supra note 34, at 393. 
53 Id.; see also Wright, supra note 21, at 44-45. 
54 See supra Section II.A. 
55 See Megan A. Janicki, Note, Better Seen Than Herded: Residency Restrictions and Global 
Positioning System Tracking Laws for Sex Offenders, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 285, 287 (2007) 
(“No one ever lost votes going after sex offenders.”). 
56 See infra Section II.B. 
57 See Troia, supra note 11, at 350. 
58 Id. at 350-55. 
59 Id. at 350. 
60 Id. at 351. 
61 Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in Sex 
Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1123 (2012) (“[T]he Court has held firm 
to the proposition that the right asserted must be ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). 
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restrictions only need to be rationally related to a legitimate state interest to be 
upheld.62 
The highest court to hear a case regarding residency restrictions for sex offenders 
imposed by a state legislature was the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.63 In Doe v. 
Miller, the court upheld the constitutionality of an Iowa statute that imposed a 
residency restriction prohibiting persons convicted of particular sex offenses 
involving minors from residing within 2,000 feet of a school or child-care facility.64 
The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute because no fundamental rights 
were violated and the residency restriction rationally advanced the state’s legitimate 
interest in promoting safety for children.65 The class of sex offenders claimed that 
Iowa’s residency restriction statute violated the “right to privacy and choice in 
family matters, the right to travel, and the fundamental right to live where you 
want.”66 The court held that the statute did not restrict those who may live with the 
sex offender67 and did not restrict a sex offender from traveling to68 or within the 
state;69 the court determined the statute simply restricted where the sex offender can 
live. The court also concluded that there was not a fundamental right to “live where 
you want.”70 
After finding that the statute did not violate any fundamental rights, the court 
then used the rational basis test to determine whether the statute “rationally advanced 
some legitimate governmental purpose.”71 The court determined that the Iowa 
legislature had a legitimate concern with the risks posed by sex offenders72 and that 
restricting where the sex offenders could live was a rational means to pursue the 
State’s legitimate interest.73 To support this determination, the court stated that 
                                                          
62 Id. (“Legislation that interferes with a fundamental right or liberty will survive 
constitutional scrutiny only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 
Without a fundamental interest to anchor the inquiry, legislation will be deemed constitutional 
if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.”). 
63 Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005). 
64 Id. at 704-05. 
65 Id. at 710-16. 
66 Id. at 709. 
67 Id. at 710. 
68 Id. at 712. 
69 Id. at 713. 
70 Id. at 714. The court, relying on prior case law, reasoned that the right was not fundamental, 
and the court noted that the appellees did not even argue that the right is “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Id. (citing 
Prostrollo v. Univ. of S.D., 507 F.2d 775, 781 (8th Cir. 1974)) (“We cannot agree that the 
right to choose one’s place of residence is necessarily a fundamental right.”). 
71 Id. at 714 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). 
72 Id. (“There can be no doubt of a legislature’s rationality in believing that ‘sex offenders are 
a serious threat in this nation,’ and that ‘when convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are 
much more likely than any other type of offender to be re-arrested for a new rape or sexual 
assault.’”) (quoting Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003)). 
73 Id. at 716. 
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600 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:591 
 
“[s]ex offenders have a high rate of recidivism, and the parties presented expert 
testimony that reducing the opportunity and temptation is important to minimizing 
the risk of reoffense.”74 It then continued to state that “it is the state legislature’s job 
to judge the best means to protect the health and welfare of its citizens ‘in an area 
where precise statistical data is unavailable and human behavior is necessarily 
unpredictable.’”75 
The Doe court also ruled against the sex offenders’ procedural due process 
claims.76 The offenders claimed that the Iowa residency restriction statute was 
unconstitutional because the statutory scheme did not have a separate process to 
determine the level of dangerousness to society that each individual offender 
posed.77 Rejecting their claim, the court stated that 
[t]he restriction applies to all offenders who have been convicted of 
certain crimes against minors, regardless of what estimates of future 
dangerousness might be proved in individualized hearings. Once such a 
legislative classification has been drawn, additional procedures are 
unnecessary, because the statute does not provide a potential exemption 
for individuals who seek to prove they are not individually dangerous or 
likely offend against neighboring schoolchildren.78 
Doe v. Miller, the case heard by the highest court thus far regarding residency 
restrictions, has been used by other courts as precedent for determining the 
constitutionality of residency restriction statutes.79 For example, it was used in Ohio 
to show that the statutes imposing residency restrictions for sex offenders did not 
violate the offenders’ substantive due process rights.80 
III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE USE OF RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS FOR 
SEX OFFENDERS 
A. Studies Showing the Ineffectiveness of Residency Restrictions 
The main goal for legislatures enacting residency restrictions against sex 
offenders is to protect children.81 However, studies show that residency restrictions 
are not effective in achieving this goal.82 The theoretical premise behind residency 
restrictions is that if sex offenders are prohibited from residing near children, they 
are unlikely to have the opportunity to reoffend; thus, sex offender recidivism is 
                                                          
74 Id. 
75 See Troia, supra note 11, at 353 (quoting Doe, 405 F.3d at 714). 
76 Doe, 405 F.3d at 709. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Wright, supra note 21, at 42. 
80 State ex rel. O’Brien v. Heimlich, 2009-Ohio-1550, ¶ 32 (10th Dist.). 
81 Tewksbury, Evidence of Ineffectiveness, supra note 47; see also Zgoba, supra note 34, at 
394. 
82 Tewksbury, Evidence of Ineffectiveness, supra note 47; see also Zgoba, supra note 34, at 
394. 
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reduced.83 However, during the period where sex offender legislation was on the 
rise,84 evidence shows that “sex offenders were the least likely to reoffend.”85 
Additionally, studies that were conducted to determine whether the residency 
restrictions actually reduce recidivism rates show “no statistically significant 
relationship between proximity to schools . . . and sex offender recidivism.”86 
One researcher noted that “residence restrictions are based on the assumption that 
if offenders live farther away from schools, daycares, and so on, they are unable or 
unlikely to access such locations.”87 However, as Judge Kuehn of the Appellate 
Court of Illinois, Fifth District, pointed out in People v. Leroy, 
[i]nnocent children . . . frolicking upon playgrounds, within eyeshot of 
some child sex offender, remain every bit the temptation that they present 
to child sex offenders at large, regardless of where those offenders live. 
Simply put, the statutory [residency] restriction is pointless. It is a 
mindless effort that does nothing to prevent any child sex offender intent 
on reoffending from doing so.88 
Alternatively, studies show that residency restrictions have a negative effect on 
the sex offenders themselves.89 Evidence shows “neighborhoods that were open to 
sex offenders (that is, they fall outside the legal residential restrictions) had fewer 
available rentals, rentals were less affordable, and were likely located in more rural 
locations.”90 With residency restrictions in place, sex offenders have reduced access 
to treatment, often live apart from family, and, in many cases, end up being 
homeless.91 Some studies even suggest that the instability caused by residency 
restrictions may lead to an increased likelihood of reoffending,92 contrary to the 
goals of the restrictions. Additionally, studies show that when residency restrictions 
                                                          
83 Mustaine, supra note 27, at 170. Mustaine disagrees with this theoretical basis by stating that 
“[a]lthough routine activity theory is an empirically valid theory for many crimes, it is 
apparently not useful for sex offenses and offenders.” Id. 
84 See Easterly, supra note 21, at 359 (stating that regulations on sex offenders increased 
dramatically after the mid-1990s). 
85 Id. at 358; see also Wright, supra note 21, at 26. 
86 Mancini, supra note 3, at 1024. 
87 Richard Tewksbury, Policy Implications of Sex Offender Residence Restrictions Laws, 10 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 345, 346 (2011) [hereinafter Tewksbury, Policy Implications]. 
88 Troia, supra note 11, at 347 (quoting People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2005)). 
89 See Rydberg et al., supra note 5, at 422; see also Tewksbury, Policy Implications, supra 
note 87, at 345; Zgoba, supra note 34, at 395 (“[A] great deal of research has indicated that 
residence restrictions yield contrary results and maintain collateral consequences that may 
lead to increased offending.”). 
90 Mustaine, supra note 27, at 172. 
91 Zgoba, supra note 34, at 395; see also Wright, supra note 21, at 43. 
92 Zgoba, supra note 34, at 395. 
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are expanded in distance (e.g. 1,000 to 2,500 feet), entire jurisdictions, such as cities 
and towns, may be excluded as options for sex offenders looking for a place to live.93 
Statutory schemes that impose residency restrictions need to be reformed.94 
Evidence shows that residency restrictions are ineffective in achieving state 
legislatures’ goals95 and negatively impact sex offenders.96 
B. Advocacy for the Targeted Use of Residency Restrictions 
Although evidence exists that shows the ineffectiveness of residency restrictions, 
states continue to utilize them as collateral consequences for convicted sex 
offenders.97 One scholar advocated for the use of residency restrictions for sex 
offenders who present a high-risk of danger to the community.98 In his article, John 
Cornwell identified the source of states’ power to impose residency restrictions, 
provided an explanation of how the restrictions fit within that power, identified some 
of the flaws of their restrictions, and discussed how limiting the application of the 
restrictions should be the primary focus.99 
Cornwell posited that states that impose residency restrictions on individuals who 
are convicted of sexual offenses are using “police power to protect public health, 
safety, and morality.”100 The Supreme Court upheld this use of police power, which 
stems from the Tenth Amendment.101 Cornwell then compared the dangers presented 
to the public by sex offenders with a plague, giving the states justification for 
quarantining sex offenders.102 Using this justification, Cornwell discussed a history 
of cases in which the Supreme Court upheld states’ use of quarantine to protect 
public safety and health.103 
                                                          
93 Mustaine, supra note 27, at 174. 
94 Id. at 170 (“It is evident that the emotional and political components involved in sex 
offender policy development do not produce legislation that is solidly based on the empirical 
evidence emerging from the relevant scientific community.”). 
95 Tewksbury et al., Examining Rates of Sexual Offenses, supra note 48, at 76. 
96 Zgoba, supra note 34, at 395; see also Mustaine, supra note 27, at 173 (“When sex 
offenders experience these difficult collateral consequences as a result of residential 
restrictions, they are not likely to reintegrate successfully back into the community.”). 
97 Cornwell, supra note 45, at 6. 
98 Id. at 15. 
99 See id. 
100 Id. at 5. 
101 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991). 
102 Cornwell, supra note 45, at 20. 
103 Id. (discussing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997) (upholding civil 
commitment of sexually violent predators); see also O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 
582-83 (1975) (upholding civil commitment of mentally ill persons for purposes other than 
treatment) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 
270, 276-77 (1940) (upholding psychiatric detention of individuals with “psychopathic 
personalities”); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 11-12 (1905) (upholding 
compulsory vaccinations of persons for the prevention of smallpox)). These cases show how 
the Supreme Court has upheld the quarantine of individuals for the sake of the health and 
safety of the public. Id. 
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After identifying the source of states’ power to impose residency restrictions and 
explaining how these restrictions on sex offenders fit within the states’ power, 
Cornwell identified various flaws with the residency restrictions imposed on sex 
offenders.104 He provided evidence that “over-inclusive restrictions may actually 
reduce public safety by driving sex offenders underground where they cannot be 
monitored by correctional and mental health agencies.”105 He also stated that over-
inclusive residency restrictions “overwhelm the system and force governments to 
make choices for financial reasons that may undermine public safety.”106 
Despite these flaws, Cornwell argued that focusing residency restrictions on the 
most dangerous sex offenders was sound policy.107 He noted that there were states, 
such as Iowa, whose sex offender statutes differentiated high-risk and low-risk 
offenders.108 Cornwell explained that “[f]ocusing residency restrictions on a smaller 
group of high-risk sex offenders is consistent . . . with data on recidivism.”109 After 
highlighting that there is a small subset of sex offenders who do have certain 
characteristics that render them a danger to society, Cornwell said that “[t]argeting 
individuals based on . . . identifiable high-risk factors makes far more sense than 
arbitrary reliance on factors such as parolee status in making statutory enforcement 
decisions.”110 
Other scholars have argued in favor of residency restrictions for sex offenders111 
because these restrictions make the public and policy-makers feel like they are doing 
something to combat to sex offenders.112 For instance, one scholar noted that “[t]he 
community has a right to both feel and live safely from sexually violent offenders, 
                                                          
104 See Cornwell, supra note 45, at 1. 
105 Id. at 14. 
106 Id. at 15. 
107 Id. at 35. 
108 Id. at 15. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 16; see also Mustaine, supra note 27, at 174.  
As noted, sex offenders are not all the same. Some are older; others are younger. Some 
have child victims; others have adult victims (and still others have both). Some were 
involved in consensual relations with victims, but the victims were under age; others 
were coercive and forceful with victims. Some offenders are juveniles or had families 
with whom they lived and must return to these families when they are released; others 
are less attached adults and must find their own housing. Some sex offenders have 
more financial resources and can afford the scarce housing that does not fall into 
restricted zones; others are destitute and end up homeless. Thinking that any one 
policy could effectively service all of these offenders borders on ridiculous. 
Id. 
111 Tewksbury, Evidence of Effectiveness, supra note 47. 
112 Id. (“[R]esidency restrictions offer the positive of symbolic value, which may be possessed 
by both policy makers and society in general (as such policies may be a ‘means of fortifying 
solidarity’ against the socially undesirable).”); see also Zgoba, supra note 34, at 394 
(“[Residency restrictions] simply make sense to lawmakers and the public.”). 
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and policy makers are well intentioned in their efforts to bring this sentiment to 
fruition.”113 
IV. RECENT STATE ACTION ON RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS FOR SEX OFFENDERS 
Recent state action in reference to residency restrictions for sex offenders has 
shown that traditional views on the statutory approaches to the restrictions may be 
changing.114 
A. California’s Approach to Residency Restrictions 
The California Supreme Court recently struck down the state’s blanket use of 
residency restrictions as unconstitutional.115 In doing so, the California Supreme 
Court became the first state supreme court to strike down residency restrictions for 
sex offenders as violations of substantive due process.116 Within In re Taylor, sex 
offenders claimed that residency restrictions imposed upon them by the State of 
California were “unconstitutionally unreasonable” under the due process clause. 117 
The trial court ultimately agreed and held:  
[T]he blanket application of the residency restrictions violates [the sex 
offenders’] constitutional rights by denying them access to nearly all 
rental housing in the county that would otherwise be available to them, 
and as a direct consequence, has caused a great many of them to become 
homeless, and has further denied them reasonable access to medical and 
psychological treatment resources, drug and alcohol dependency services, 
job counseling, and other social services to which parolees are entitled by 
law.118 
The appellate court and Supreme Court of California subsequently upheld the trial 
court’s conclusions.119 
As the sex offenders alleged that the residency restrictions infringed on their 
substantive due process rights, the court had to determine whether the rights 
allegedly infringed upon were fundamental.120 The sex offenders specifically alleged 
that the restrictions infringed upon the “rights to intrastate travel, to establish and 
maintain a home, and to privacy and free association with others within one’s 
                                                          
113 Zgoba, supra note 34, at 396. 
114 See discussion infra Section V. 
115 In re Taylor, 343 P.3d 867 (Cal. 2015). California’s residency restrictions were enacted in 
the Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law. Id. at 869. The residency 
restrictions prevented sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet of a public or private school, 
or a park where children regularly gather. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5(b) (2006)). 
116 Cornwell, supra note 45, at 16-17. 
117 Taylor, 343 P.3d at 877. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 869. 
120 Id. at 878 (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause ‘forbids the government to 
infringe . . .  fundamental liberty interests in any manner’ unless the infringement is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”). 
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home.”121 The court discussed that the level of review would depend on whether the 
rights claimed by the sex offenders were fundamental; it would be strict scrutiny if 
the rights were fundamental, and it would be rational basis if the rights were not 
fundamental.122 
The court in Taylor stated that it did not need to decide whether strict scrutiny or 
rational basis review applied because the blanket residency restrictions for sex 
offenders could not even survive the rational basis review.123 The court pointed out 
both the harsh and severe restrictions and the disabilities on liberty and privacy 
rights.124 The court also discussed how the residency restrictions hampered efforts to 
monitor, supervise, and rehabilitate sex offenders, which ran contrary to what the 
restrictions were designed to accomplish.125 The court held that the residency 
restrictions bore no rational relationship to advancing the state’s legitimate goal of 
protecting children from sexual predators.126 
Additionally, the respondents in In re Taylor argued that the sex offenders do not 
have the same protections as the general public while they are on parole.127 The court 
responded by stating that “all parolees retain certain basic rights and liberty interests, 
and enjoy a measure of constitutional protection against the arbitrary, oppressive and 
unreasonable curtailment of ‘the core values of unqualified liberty.’”128 
Although the Taylor court struck down the blanket application of residency 
restrictions, the court emphasized that the Department of Corrections retained 
authority to impose special restrictions on sex offenders, including residency 
restrictions, so long as they were supported by the “particularized circumstance of 
each individual case.”129 
B. Massachusetts’ Approach to Residency Restrictions 
 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts also recently struck down the blanket 
use of residency restrictions for sex offenders.130 In City of Lynn, a municipality 
                                                          
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 879. 
124 Id. at 881 (discussing how registered sex offenders could be cut off from access to public 
transportation, medical care, and other social services to which they are entitled, as well as 
reasonable opportunities for employment due to restrictions). 
125 Id. (providing residency restrictions increased incidences of homelessness, making it 
harder to supervise and track offenders, which undermines the governmental objective to keep 
the public safe); see also Cornwell, supra note 45, at 32 (“That one-third of the individuals 
subject to Jessica’s Law in San Diego County were homeless was especially troubling to the 
court, since it has severely compromised law enforcement’s ability to effectively monitor and 
supervise that population.”). 
126 Taylor, 343 P.3d at 879. 
127 Id. at 878. 
128 Id. at 882 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). 
129 Taylor, 343 P.3d at 882. 
130 Doe v. City of Lynn, 36 N.E.3d 18, 24-25 (Mass. 2015) (discussing a city ordinance that 
imposed a 1,000 feet residency restriction against level two and three sex offenders, 
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enacted an ordinance for sex offenders to “to add location restrictions to such 
offenders where the State law is silent.”131 The court noted that “[t]he geographical 
and temporal reach of the ordinance effectively prohibit[ed] all level two and three 
sex offenders from establishing residence, or even spending the night in a shelter, in 
ninety-five per cent of the residential properties in Lynn.”132 
The court in City of Lynn determined that the residency restriction imposed by 
the city ordinance was unconstitutional because it was “inconsistent with the 
comprehensive [state] statutory scheme governing the oversight of convicted sex 
offenders. . . .”133 The state had already established a registration scheme with a very 
narrow residency restriction that only applied to level-three sex offenders.134 The 
court held that not only did the state establish a comprehensive statutory scheme, but 
also, the ordinance would negatively affect the ability to monitor and track sex 
offenders.135 This allowed the court to infer that the legislature of Massachusetts 
“intended to preclude local regulation of sex offender residency options.”136 
The court then noted that even the narrow residency restriction imposed on level 
three offenders would be unconstitutional without an individualized assessment of 
the offender to determine whether the offender posed a risk to the public.137 The 
court in City of Lynn recognized arguments against the blanket use of residency 
restrictions as well.138 The court proclaimed that “the days are long since past when 
whole communities of persons, such [as] Native Americans and Japanese-
Americans[,] may be lawfully banished from our midst.”139 The court also pointed 
out that imposing residency restrictions disrupts the home situation of the sex 
offender, a factor that has been recognized to reduce recidivism rates.140 The court 
                                                                                                                                         
prohibiting the offenders from living within the restricted area of public, private, and church 
schools). 
131 Id. at 20 (“The stated purpose of the ordinance is to ‘reduce the potential risk of harm to 
children of the community by impacting the ability of registered sex offenders to be in contact 
with unsuspecting children in locations that are primarily designed for use by, or are primarily 
used by children.’”). 
132 Id. (discussing that a sex offender would have difficulty in moving to a nearby town or 
city, as many of them had similar restrictions on sex offenders). 
133 Id. at 19. 
134 Id. at 24 (emphasizing that, for level three sex offenders, the residency restriction, with the 
aim of protecting a vulnerable population, only precluded them from living in rest homes or 
other long-term care facilities) (“Registration information for level one sex offenders is not 
provided to the public, information for level two and level three offenders is available to the 
public by request or on the Internet, and information for level three offenders may be 
disseminated actively to the public.”). 
135 Id. at 23. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 24-25 (citing Doe v. Police Comm’r of Bos., 951 N.E.2d 337 (Mass. 2011)). 
138 City of Lynn, 36 N.E.3d at 25. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 26. 
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held that this conflicted with the legislature’s goal of protecting the public from sex 
offenders.141 
V. OHIO’S CURRENT APPROACH ON RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS 
A. Ohio Statutes Regulating Sex Offenders 
Ohio’s legislature has passed laws to regulate sex offenders in the state.142 In 
reference to the registration and notification requirements for sex offenders,143 Ohio 
law establishes a tiered system to categorize sex offenders depending on the crime 
underlying the conviction.144 Ohio also imposes residency restrictions on sex 
offenders, and they are imposed regardless of which tier the sex offender has been 
assigned.145 This means that Ohio imposes residency restrictions “on all registered 
                                                          
141 Id. 
142 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2950.01-.99 (West 2016); State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 
1110, 1117-18 (Ohio 2011)); see also Schubert, supra note 27, at 277 (“S.B. 10 was enacted 
to amend, among other chapters, chapter 2950 of the Ohio Revised Code in order to bring 
Ohio sex offender registration laws into compliance with the [Adam Walsh Act]”). Ohio’s 
current scheme of laws regarding sex offenders is based on the federal Adam Walsh Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 16901-16962 (2006). 
143 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.04(A)(1)(a) (“[O]ffender[s] shall register personally with the 
sheriff, or the sheriff’s designee, of the county in which the offender was convicted of or 
pleaded guilty to the sexually oriented offense.”); see also Schubert, supra note 27, at 288 
(“That notification includes the offender’s: (1) name; (2) address; (3) offense and conviction; 
(4) classification; and (5) photograph.”). 
144 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.01. Tier I offenses are: importuning, unlawful sexual 
conduct with a minor, voyeurism, sexual imposition, gross sexual imposition, illegal use of a 
minor in nudity-oriented material or performance, and child enticement. Id. at § 2950.01(E). 
Tier II offenses are: compelling prostitution, pandering obscenity involving a minor, illegal 
use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or performance (different subsections from Tier I 
offense), child endangering, kidnapping with sexual motivation, unlawful sexual conduct with 
a minor, and any sexual offense that occurs after the offender has been classified as a Tier I 
sex offender. Id. at § 2950.01(F). Tier III offenses are: rape, sexual battery, aggravated murder 
with sexual motivation, unlawful death or termination of pregnancy as a result of committing 
or attempting to commit a felony with sexual motivation, kidnapping of minor to engage in 
sexual activity, kidnapping of minor not by parent, gross sexual imposition (if victim under 
13), felonious assault with sexual motivation, and any sexual offense that occurs after the 
offender has been classified as a Tier II sex offender. Id. at § 2950.01(G); see also Schubert, 
supra note 27, at 287 (“[T]he duration and frequency of the registration of sex offenders is 
determined by the tier and is as follows: (1) Tier I sex offenders must register every year for 
fifteen years; (2) Tier II offenders must register every 180 days for twenty-five years; (3) Tier 
III offenders must register every ninety days for life.”). 
145 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.034 (“No person who has been convicted of, is convicted of, 
has pleaded guilty to, or pleads guilty to a sexually oriented offense or a child-victim oriented 
offense shall establish a residency or occupy residential premises within one thousand feet of 
any school premises or preschool or child day-care premises.”); see also Schubert, supra note 
27, at 288 (“In addition, landlords are permitted to terminate rental agreements and seek 
injunctive relief in an effort to oust the offender from the residence.”). 
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sex offenders regardless of the crime’s severity, whether or not the victim was a 
minor, or if the offender presents a future risk of danger.146  
In enacting these laws against sex offenders, the Ohio legislature found that 
“[s]ex offenders and child-victim offenders pose a risk of engaging in further 
sexually abusive behavior even after being released from imprisonment, a prison 
term, or other confinement or detention, and protection of members of the public 
from sex offenders and child-victim offenders is a paramount governmental 
interest.”147 It also found that “[a] person who is found to be a sex offender or a 
child-victim offender has a reduced expectation of privacy because of the public’s 
interest in public safety and in the effective operation of government.”148 
B. Retroactivity and Residency Restrictions 
Ohio’s residency restrictions, first enacted in 2003149 and amended in 2007,150 are 
not to be applied retroactively.151 In Hyle v. Porter, the Supreme Court of Ohio held 
that Ohio’s initial residency restrictions statute, formerly Ohio Revised Code Section 
2950.031, was only prospective in nature.152 In determining whether the residency 
restrictions could apply retroactively, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “because 
R.C. 2950.031 was not expressly made retroactive, it does not apply to an offender 
who bought his home and committed his offense before the effective date of the 
statute.”153 
Subsequently, an Ohio appellate court further defined how courts are to 
determine whether the residency restrictions are being applied retroactively to sex 
offenders.154 The court first noted that the only difference between the current statute 
enacting residency restrictions, Section 2950.034, and the statute that preceded it, 
Section 2950.031, was the current statute’s restriction from preschools and daycare 
centers.155 The court discussed the analysis used to determine what types of conduct 
                                                          
146 Troia, supra note 11; see also Schubert, supra note 27, at 288 (“One of the most significant 
differences between R.C. chapter 2950, as amended by H.B. 180, and R.C. chapter 2950, as 
amended by S.B. 10, is that H.B. 180 amendments allowed judges to use discretion when 
determining a sex offender’s classification. Therefore, under H.B. 180 amendments, judges 
were able to determine the sex offender’s risk of recidivism, and then apply the appropriate 
sex offender registration requirements necessary to protect the community from the sex 
offender. The enactment of S.B. 10 erased this discretion and now requires all current sex 
offenders to be classified or re-classified under one of the three tiers, which are based solely 
on the offense committed.”). 
147 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.02(A)(2). 
148 Id. at § 2950.02(A)(5). 
149 OHIO REV. CODE § 2950.031 (2007), invalidated by State v. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d 753 (Ohio 
2010). 
150 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.034. 
151 Hyle v. Porter, 882 N.E.2d 899, 901 (Ohio 2008). 
152 Id. at 902. 
153 Id. at 904. 
154 See O’Brien v. Phillips, 43 N.E.3d 1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015). 
155 Id. at 5. 
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would trigger the retroactive application of the residency restrictions.156 Based on 
that analysis, the court held that it was the conviction for the sex offense that triggers 
the application of the residency restrictions; therefore, as long as the conviction 
occurs after the effective date of the statute enacting the residency restrictions, the 
statute is not operating retroactively.157 
C. Ex Post Facto Considerations for Residency Restrictions 
The holding of another Ohio case furthers the notion that the amendments to 
Ohio’s statutory treatment of sex offenders cannot be applied retroactively.158 The 
State v. Williams court held that Ohio’s statutory scheme regulating sex offenders is 
punitive after S.B. 10.159 In pertinent part, the court held: 
Sex offenders are no longer allowed to challenge their classifications as 
sex offenders because classification is automatic depending on the 
offense. Judges no longer review the sex-offender classification. In 
general, sex offenders are required to register more often and for a longer 
period of time. They are required to register in person and in several 
different places. . . . Furthermore, all the registration requirements apply 
without regard to the future dangerousness of the sex offender. Instead, 
registration requirements and other requirements are based solely on the 
fact of a conviction. Based on these significant changes to the statutory 
scheme governing sex offenders, we are no longer convinced that R.C. 
Chapter 2950 is remedial, even though some elements of it remain 
remedial. We conclude that as to a sex offender whose crime was 
committed prior to the enactment of S.B. 10, the act ‘imposes new or 
additional burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities to a past transaction’ . 
. . and “creates new burdens, new duties, new obligations, or new 
liabilities not existing at the time.”160 
This classification is important because 
when a law is deemed to be punitive, substantive and procedural 
constitutional protections must flow from that determination. One 
constitutional limitation on criminal legislation is the Ex Post Facto 
Clause, which prohibits retroactive application of a law that “inflicts a 
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when 
committed.”161  
Therefore, if Ohio’s statutes regarding sex offenders were applied retroactively, 
there would potentially be Ex Post Facto ramifications following the State v. 
Williams holding. 
                                                          
156 Id. at 6. 
157 Id. 
158 See State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011). 
159 Id. at 1112. 
160 Id. at 1113. 
161 Carpenter, supra note 61, at 1105. 
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D. Due Process and Residency Restrictions 
Ohio courts have held that residency restrictions imposed on sex offenders are 
constitutional under the Due Process Clause.162 In O’Brien v. Hill, the court held that 
the residency restrictions do not infringe on a fundamental right of sex offenders.163 
The court stated Ohio courts have consistently rejected arguments that Ohio’s 
residency restrictions infringe on the right of sex offenders to use and enjoy 
property.164  
The appellate court then quoted its holding in State ex rel. O’Brien v. Heimlich: 
[A]lthough former R.C. 2950.031(A) prohibits appellant from residing 
within 1,000 feet of a school premises, the statute does not preclude him 
from owning, renting, or leasing a home within 1,000 feet of a school 
premises. Sexually oriented offenders are simply precluded from living 
within 1,000 feet of a school premises. Accordingly, the statute does not 
impair appellant’s substantive property rights as enumerated in the Ohio 
Constitution.165 
The court also proclaimed that the freedom to live wherever a person wants is not 
fundamental, despite its importance.166 
Because the residency restrictions did not violate a fundamental right, the court 
used a rational basis review to determine whether the restrictions were 
constitutional.167 Using this level of review, the court stated that the statute imposing 
residency restrictions was rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in 
protecting children.168 
V. A TAILORED APPROACH FOR OHIO TO EFFECTUATE ITS OVERALL GOAL OF 
PROTECTING CHILDREN 
Ohio should shift from its current system of implementing residency restrictions 
on a blanket basis to the case-by-case system suggested in California and 
Massachusetts.169 Various scholars support this suggestion as well.170 Instead of 
imposing residency restrictions on anyone “who has been convicted of, is convicted 
of, has plead guilty to, or pleads guilty to a sexually oriented offense or a child-
                                                          
162 See, e.g., O’Brien v. Hill, 965 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. (quoting O’Brien v. Heimlich, 2009-Ohio-1550, at ¶ 31 (10th Dist.)). 
166 Hill, 965 N.E.2d at 1053. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. (citing O’Brien, 2009-Ohio-1550). 
169 See In re Taylor, 343 P.3d 867 (Cal. 2015); see also Doe v. City of Lynn, 36 N.E.3d 18 
(Mass. 2015). 
170 See Cornwell, supra note 45, at 1; see also Zgoba, supra note 34 (“Rather than a generic 
approach to dealing with sex offenders, criminal justice practices should fundamentally rely 
on the individualized, empirically tested risk assessments conducted in most states. This 
tailored approach offers a reasonable and justifiable alternative to the broad policies currently 
in existence.”). 
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss4/10
2017] PUSHING THE LIMITS 611 
 
victim oriented offense,”171 the judges in Ohio would have the ability to impose 
residency restrictions after first having an individualized assessment completed to 
determine his or her risk to the public.172 After completing the assessment, sex 
offenders who are deemed to have a high probability of reoffending would be 
eligible for residency restrictions, and possibly other restrictions, imposed upon 
them.173 Sex offenders who have a low probability of reoffending will have 
appropriate restrictions placed on them that will not impede on the treatment and 
support they will need to rehabilitate. 
Changing Ohio’s current system of imposing residency restrictions to a case-by-
case approach will address some of the flaws of the system imposing the restrictions 
on a blanket basis. First, by conducting an individual assessment to make a 
determination on the dangerousness of the sex offender to the public, there would be 
evidence to support the imposition of the residency restrictions on that particular sex 
offender. This individualized approached would eliminate the argument that the 
residency restrictions are an “unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive” action of the 
state.174 
Second, by targeting the use of residency restrictions to those who are deemed a 
high-risk of danger to the public, the burden on law enforcement would decrease. 
The current system requires law enforcement to expend resources on sex offenders 
who are unlikely to reoffend. This inefficient use of resources is wasteful.175 The 
case-by-case system would allow law enforcement resources to be focused on 
monitoring and enforcing the residency restrictions on the sex offenders who may 
actually pose a risk to children, further effectuating the stated goals of the statute. As 
noted in his review of In re Taylor, Cornwell described the inability of law 
enforcement officials to effectively monitor and supervise sex offenders, thereby 
putting the public at risk, as one of the main reasons that the court held that the 
                                                          
171 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.034 (West 2016). 
172 See Schubert, supra note 27, at 284-85. Ohio utilized individualized assessments to 
determine the dangerousness of sex offenders prior to 2003. The factors used to determine the 
dangerousness of the sex offenders were 
(1) the offender’s age; (2) any prior criminal record; (3) the age of the victims; (4) the 
number of victims; (5) whether drugs or alcohol were used to impair the victim; (6) 
whether any prior convictions or pleas led to any available programs for sex 
offenders; (7) mental illness or mental disability; (8) the nature of the conduct with the 
victim and evidence of a pattern of abuse; (9) whether the offender acted with cruelty 
or threatened cruelty; (10) any additional behavior that contributed to the conduct.  
Id. 
173 See, e.g., Mustaine, supra note 27, at 174. Sex offenders at high risk for sexually 
recidivating with child victims may be managed effectively with residential boundary 
restrictions, while young adult offenders with slightly younger (but still underage) consensual 
victims are likely to need other types of restrictions/treatment to keep them law abiding. In 
essence, it is unlikely that all sex offenders need residency restrictions to remain in the 
community. Id. 
174 In re Taylor, 343 P.3d 867, 879 (Cal. 2015). 
175 Zgoba, supra note 34, at 396. 
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statute in California was not rationally related to protecting children from sex 
offenders.176 
Third, reducing the number of sex offenders subject to residency restrictions 
diminishes the concentration of sex offenders in those designated areas with limited 
housing options.177 Arguably, it would also help mitigate homelessness in this 
particular population because there would be less competition for the available 
housing options in the limited areas outside of the restricted zones for sex offenders. 
Ameliorating homelessness would not only increase the quality of life for sex 
offenders, but also would allow law enforcement officers to better monitor and 
supervise sex offenders, making the public at large safer. 
Fourth, changing Ohio’s system of imposing residency restrictions to a case-by-
case system would address the arguments that the current system of imposing the 
restrictions is excessive.178 The inclusion of an individualized risk assessment would 
limit the focus of the residency restrictions to those who pose the greatest risk to 
public safety.179 
Finally, changing Ohio’s system of imposing residency restrictions to a case-by-
case system would place Ohio in accord with the current shift across the nation in 
managing these types of restrictions for sex offenders.180 Courts are recognizing that 
an assessment of the risk that is posed by each sex offender is needed,181 as not all 
sex offenders pose the same risk to children.182 Changing Ohio’s system would give 
its courts the freedom to make an individualized determination of the risk that a sex 
offender poses. 
The blanket use of residency restrictions is one of the reasons for the 
ineffectiveness in reducing recidivism rates.183 By imposing residency restrictions on 
all persons convicted of sex offenses without making a determination of the 
offender’s likelihood to reoffend, some states, including Ohio,184 are burdening some 
                                                          
176 Cornwell, supra note 45, at 33. 
177 This argument assumes similar results as currently seen in California’s new approach after 
In re Taylor. See Editorial, New Residency Restrictions Help Officers Keep Better Tabs on 
High Risk Sex Offenders, VENTURA CTY. STAR (Dec. 15, 2015), 
http://www.vcstar.com/opinion/editorials/editorial-new-residency-restrictions-help-officers-
keep-better-tabs-on-high-risk-sex-offenders-26f2c-362543891.html. 
178 See Cornwell, supra note 45, at 29 (“Sex offender residency restrictions in some 
jurisdictions focus, like pretrial detention and civil commitment, on a select group of 
individuals who pose a heightened risk of danger to the community . . . Statutes in other 
jurisdictions lack any individualized risk assessment, the absence of which has concerned 
courts, leading some to find an ex post facto violation.”). 
179 Id. 




182 See Mustaine, supra note 27, at 174. 
183 Troia, supra note 11, at 358. 
184 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.034 (West 2016). 
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individuals unlikely to reoffend.185 As a result, Ohio wastes valuable resources 
enforcing residency restrictions on individuals who are unlikely to benefit from 
them. 186 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although protecting the safety and well-being of children is an important goal,187 
laws that are enacted to accomplish this goal should be tailored so that they are most 
effective. On its face, imposing blanket residency restrictions to prevent sexual 
offenders from living in close proximity to children appears to promote the goal of 
protecting children. However, in practice, the residency restrictions impose great 
burdens, such as higher risks of homelessness and limited access to social services,188 
on convicted sex offenders without accomplishing the goal of protecting children.189  
Research shows residency restrictions have failed to reduce recidivism rates.190 
A well-known scholar and author on the topic of sex offenders proclaimed, “We 
are not being smart. We are just flailing about. We need to enact laws based on the 
latest headline case. Politicians under pressure pass symbolic [residency] laws . . . 
that are not based on any solid research.”191 
Ohio should amend its current law imposing residency restrictions on a blanket 
basis for those convicted of sex offenses and utilize individual assessments to 
determine whether an offender is likely to reoffend. This shift would give Ohio’s 
judges greater discretion to retain residency restrictions for the state’s more 
dangerous offenders. As described above, statutes imposing residency restrictions on 
sex offenders began with benevolence but have overreached due to unfounded fears 
and misconceptions. Despite substantial research demonstrating the ineffectiveness 
of their current application, lawmakers, especially at the local level, continue to 
promote their use in a misguided effort to protect the children in their communities. 





                                                          
185 Troia, supra note 11, at 358. 
186 Zgoba, supra note 34, at 396. 
187 OHIO REV. CODE § 2950.02 (A)(2) (“Sex offenders and child-victim offenders pose a risk 
of engaging in further sexually abusive behavior even after being released from imprisonment, 
a prison term, or other confinement or detention, and protection of members of the public 
from sex offenders and child-victim offenders is a paramount governmental interest.”). 
188 Zgoba, supra note 34, at 395. 
189 See Tewksbury, Policy Implications, supra note 87. 
190 See id. 
191 Troia, supra note 11, at 343-44 (quoting Ian Demsky, Sex Offenders Live Near Many 
Schools, Day Cares, THE TENNESSEAN, July 18, 2005, at A1). 
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